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CardSpace
• CardSpace is a Microsoft architecture for identity 
management.
• It has a number of component parts:
– A distributed architecture for identity management;
– A set of defined Web Services interfaces between 
entities in the architecture;
– A set of software is available for both Vista and XP 
which will enable users to manage their identities in a 
Windows environment;
– Development support to enable applications to use 
CardSpace managed identities. 
5Identity Metasystem
• Microsoft refers to this collection of 
components as an Identity Metasystem.
• The idea is to provide a unified way for 
(Windows) users to use many different 
underlying identity management systems.
• Key ideas here are:
– provide a simple user model for identity;
– enable users to control which identity is used 
for what purpose.
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What about Passport?
• Microsoft’s experience with Passport has been 
rather painful.
• They tried to solve the problem of identity 
management by becoming the global identity 
provider.
• This idea failed abysmally – the main lesson is 
that there will never be such a global identity 
provider.
• This has led to CardSpace, as a means of 
supporting an identity ecosystem with multiple 
providers …
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The Laws of Identity
• In 2004/05 Microsoft (Kim Cameron) 
started a blog on identity.
• The purpose was to test Microsoft’s 
evolving ideas about identity and the 
management of identities.
• This in turn has affected the development 
of things such as CardSpace.
• Cameron also developed a set of 
principles called the Laws of Identity.
9The identity problem
• The Internet has arisen without any unified 
notion of user identity.
• As a result, there are many different solutions in 
place for managing identities.
• Almost every website has a different way of 
managing login, and collecting various bits and 
pieces of personal information.
• As a result, various solutions for identity 
management (notably SSO schemes) have 
emerged.
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Criminality and identity
• Serious threats to identity have emerged, 
notably phishing and pharming attacks.
• Problems arise because users do not know who 
their PC is talking to.
• Users are tricked into revealing credentials 
and/or installing malicious software.
• In parallel, businesses holding multiple user 
identities are attacked, and identity data (e.g. 
credit card numbers) is compromised.
• Better ways of managing identities needed …
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Identity management is tough
• Currently, the only successful ID management 
schemes are those for particular domains, e.g.:
– Kerberos within companies;
– Special-purpose PKIs for company use, and for 
specific systems (e.g. EMV);
– Passport for MSN/Microsoft.
• No global schemes – no universal PKI.
• Identity is context-specific, which makes a 
universal global identity provider very unlikely.
12
Some identity definitions
• Digital identity: a set of claims made by 
one digital subject about itself or another 
digital subject.
• Digital subject: a person or thing, 
represented or existing in the digital realm.
• Claim: an assertion of the truth of 
something.
13
Comments  I
• The Microsoft definition of digital identity is 
a very general one, and does not 
distinguish between two concepts which 
are often treated separately:
– identifiers or labels (e.g. email address, 
National Insurance Number, passport 
number, …);
– attributes (e.g. the identity holder is an 
employee of company X, a silver card holder 
for airline Y, a season ticket holder for train 
route Z, …)
14
Comments  II
• There are two main justifications for the 
Microsoft ‘claims’ approach:
– it enables protocol interactions to be simplified – a 
single protocol can be used to transfer claims;
– some types of claim are difficult to categorise – a 
credit card number may be viewed as both an 
identifier and an attribute.
• However, on the down side, human beings by 
and large understand the distinction between the 
two types of claim – this means that it may be a 
useful distinction. 
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The Laws of Identity
• Microsoft has devised a set of seven Laws 
of Identity, which capture the philosophy 
behind CardSpace.
• In fact, if adhered to, these laws appear to 
have quite general repercussions for 
privacy in information systems.
• Rather grand claims are made for the 
general truth of these ‘laws’.
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Law 1.  User Control and Consent 
Technical identity systems must only reveal 
information identifying a user with the 
user’s consent.
• Success of a system requires user trust, 
and giving users control will build trust.
• The law permits implementations where 
the metasystem allows the users to decide 
to automatically use identity information in 
a specific context.
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Law 2.  Minimal Disclosure
The solution that discloses the least amount 
of identifying information and best limits its 
use is the most stable long-term solution.
• This approach minimises risk by using the 
‘need to know’ principle.
• It also reduces risk of attack.
• This also means minimising use of global 
identifiers (as opposed to local identifiers).
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Law 3.  Justifiable Parties
Digital identity systems must be designed so [that] 
the disclosure of identifying information is limited 
to parties having a necessary and justifiable 
place in a given identity relationship.
• The user must be aware of who he/she is 
sharing information with.
• This law is seen to explain the failure of 
Passport – Microsoft was not seen as a 
‘necessary and justifiable’ general purpose 
identity provider.
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Law 4.  Directed Identity
A universal identity system must support both 
‘omni-directional’ identifiers for use by public 
entities, and ‘uni-directional’ identifiers for use by 
private entities, thus facilitating discovery while 
preventing unnecessary release of correlation 
handles.
• A uni-directional identifier is essentially a 
pseudonym.
• In general, pseudonyms should be used unless 
there is a good reason not to. 
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Law 5.  Pluralism of Operators and Technologies
A universal identity system must channel and 
enable the inter-working of multiple identity 
technologies run by multiple identity providers.
• This is self-evident – we all use a multiplicity of 
different identities, with the choice of identity 
depending on the context – this is not going to 
change.
• A universal metasystem must clearly support all 
these types of identity.
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Law 6.  Human Integration
The universal identity metasystem must define the 
human user to be a component of the distributed 
system integrated through unambiguous human-
machine communication mechanisms offering 
protection against identity attacks.
• The human user is a key component – the lack 
of human understanding of the PC interface 
(and the identities it displays) leads to phishing 
and pharming.
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Law 7.  Consistent Experience Across Contexts
The unifying identity metasystem must guarantee 
its users a simple, consistent experience while 
enabling separation of contexts through multiple 
operators and technologies.
• To support the previous law, users need a 
consistent view of identity across multiple 
applications.
• This consistency should be supported by the 
identity metasystem, and more generally by the 
user experience across applications.
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Entities
• CardSpace defines three types of entity:
– Users/Clients, i.e. the entities (digital subjects) 
for whom identities are managed;
– Relying Parties, i.e. entities who wish to have 
some assurance regarding an identity for a 
user;
– Identity Providers (IPs), i.e. entities issuing 
identities and providing assurance regarding 
identities to Relying Parties.
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Use of cryptography
• Like Liberty, CardSpace is based on the 
use of cryptography.
• The main interactions between principals 
are cryptographically protected.
• Of course, the human user may 
authenticate to an Identity Provider using 
non-cryptographic means, e.g. user 
name/password.
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CardSpace interaction model
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Model operation  I
• The service requester is a client application 
running on the client (user) system.
• The relying party is the target service the user 
wishes to access via the service requester.
• One or more identity providers can issue 
security tokens (to support client authentication).
• The target service may optionally delegate 
authentication/validation of user identity to an 
Authentication/Authorisation Security Token 
Service.
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Model operation  II
• The user, interacting with the service requester 
via the identity selector, may have identities 
issued by one or more IPs.
• Each identity is represented by an InfoCard held 
by the identity selector, and this InfoCard is the 
means by which the user interacts with the 
identity selector to choose which identity to use.
• Each IP runs a Security Token Service (STS), to 
generate security tokens.
• A Self-issued Identity Provider may be provided 
by a client platform to allow use of self-issued 
tokens.
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Model operation  (numbered steps I)
1. Service requester gets the security policy of 
the target service.  We suppose that the policy 
requires the requester to get a token issued by 
an IP’s STS.
2. (optional) The service requester gets the policy 
of the authentication/authorisation STS (to 
determine properties of required token).
3. The requester asks the identity selector to 
provide a security token meeting the policy of 
the target service.
4. The identity selector first gets the user to 
choose an InfoCard capable of meeting the 
target service requirements, and then gets the 
policy of the selected IP’s STS.
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Model operation  (numbered steps II)
5. The InfoCard indicates the method to be used 
to authenticate the user to the IP STS; the user 
sends an appropriate credential to the IP STS, 
and the identity selector gets back a token.
6. The token is given to the service requester.
7. (optional) The service requester presents the 
token to the STS, which generates a token for 
the target service.
8. The service requester presents the token to 
the target service to get access.
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Message flow for CardSpace
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Use of WS-security
• The interactions between principals are all 
web services based.
• They use mechanisms from:
– WS-Trust (Web Services Trust Language);
– WS-SecurityPolicy (Web Services Security 
Policy Language);
– WS-MetadataExchange (Web Services 
Metadata Exchange).
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CardSpace-Liberty differences
• Clearly there are differences in scope.  Notably, 
CardSpace addresses user identity management.
• However, there are clear overlaps and also clear 
inconsistencies.
• Liberty provides profiles which work in the absence 
of identity management software on the client.
• CardSpace, by contrast, is built round client 
software.
• The existing Liberty profiles for the SSO and 
Federation Protocol are not consistent with 
CardSpace.
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User interface issues
• A key component of the CardSpace 
architecture is the way that identities are 
presented to users.
• The objective is to provide a unified and 
simple way to manage multiple user 
identities.
• This applies even when the identities rely 
on vastly different technologies.
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Interactions
• We now look in a little more detail at the 
interactions between the main entities in the 
CardSpace architecture.
• These interactions are WS based.
• Note that the form of security tokens is not 
constrained by CardSpace – because of the 
goal of supporting arbitrary identity schemes.
• Hence the messages are primarily about 
shipping arbitrary data structures between the 
parties.
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Requirements – Relying Party
• A CardSpace Relying Party will need to support:
– authentication of itself using an X.509 certificate 
including a logo (to assist user recognition);
– use of WS-SecurityPolicy to express security 
requirements of the services it provides;
– retrieval of its service metadata, including WSDL and 
policy, using WS-MetadataExchange;
– submission of security tokens bound to application 
messages by service requester using WS-
SecurityPolicy mechanisms.
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Requirements – Identity Provider
• A CardSpace IP will need to support:
– issue of InfoCards to users;
– use of WS-Trust mechanisms, notably the 
RequestSecurityToken and 
RequestSecurityTokenResponse messages to issue 
security tokens based on an InfoCard;
– extensions of/restrictions to WS-Trust required by 
CardSpace;
– expression of security requirements of its STS using 
WS-SecurityPolicy;
– one or more of the CardSpace authentication 
mechanisms to allows users to authenticate to its STS.
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Relying Party Interactions
• We consider the means used by a Relying 
Party (RP) to convey to a service 
requester both:
– its requirements for security tokens, and
– its own identity.
• Security policy mechanisms as specified in 
WS-SecurityPolicy are used to indicate the 
RP token requirements and how 
messages should be secured.
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Identifying the RP – requirements
• When an RP requests verification of a 
user identity in the form a security token 
containing claims, the user needs to first 
reliably identify the RP to make the trust 
decision.
• This requires conveying RP identity to 
service requester in a human-friendly and
verifiable manner. 
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Identifying the RP – recommendations
• CardSpace recommends use of an X.509 v3 
certificate for an organisation including:
– unique subject identifier;
– logo for organisation.
• Inclusion of a logo (strictly a logotype) helps to 
simplify human interpretation of certificate 
content.
• Security tokens sent by the identity selector to 
the organisation will be encrypted using the 
public key from the organisation certificate.
42
Expressing token reqs. of RP
• An RP expresses its token requirements as part 
of its security policy, using primitives and 
assertions specified in WS-SecurityPolicy.
• The default for an IP is to provide a token 
generated using symmetric cryptography.
• However, CardSpace recommends use of 
asymmetric cryptography for tokens.
• This is because it enables the IP to generate a 
signed token without knowing who the RP is, 
hence enhancing user privacy.
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InfoCards
• An InfoCard represents a single digital 
identity for a user issued by an IP.
• Multiple identities for the same user (from 
same IP) would give separate InfoCards.
• The InfoCard is not a security token used 
to carry identity claims – it simply 
represents the relationship with the IP.
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InfoCard contents
• An InfoCard carries the IP’s issuing policy for 
tokens, including:
– token types it supports;
– claim types it handles;
– the credential to use for user authentication.
• It must contain enough information about the 
IP’s capabilities to allow the identity selector to 
match it with the RP’s token requirements.
• The user can then select a suitable InfoCard 
from amongst those available.
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InfoCard format
• InfoCards are XML documents; can be stored on 
any user device.
• An InfoCard is not particularly security-sensitive 
(except that it reveals a relationship between a 
user and an IP).
• The security-sensitive processes are:
– user authentication to an IP (using a method specified 
in CardSpace);
– generation of tokens by IP and transfer to RP;
– verification of tokens by RP.
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InfoCard example
<InfoCard
xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2005/05/identity"
xmlns:wsa=”http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/08/addressing”
xmlns:wsp=”http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/12/policy”
xml:lang=”en-us”>
<InfoCardReference>
<CardId>http://xyz.com/CardId/d795621fa01d454285f9</CardId>
</InfoCardReference>
<CardName>XYZ membership card</CardName>
<CardImage MimeType=”image/gif”> ... </CardImage>
<IssuerName>XYZ Authority</IssuerName>
<TimeIssued>2003-08-24T00:30:05Z</TimeIssued>
<TokenServiceReference>
<TokenService>
<wsa:EndpointReference>
<wsa:Address>http://xyz.org/sts</wsa:Address>
<wsid:Identity>
<ds:KeyInfo>
<ds:X509Data>
<ds:X509Certificate>...</ds:X509Certificate>
</ds:X509Data>
</ds:KeyInfo>
</wsid:Identity>
</wsa:EndpointReference>
<UserNamePasswordAuthenticate>
<Username>Zoe</Username>
</UserNamePasswordAuthenticate>
</TokenService>
</TokenServiceReference>
<ic:InfoCardPolicy>
<SupportedTokenTypes>
<TokenType URI=”urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion”/>
</SupportedTokenTypes>
<SupportedClaims>
<SupportedClaim URI=”http://.../ws/2005/05/identity/claims/givenname”>
<DisplayTag>Given Name</DisplayTag>
</SupportedClaim>
<SupportedClaim URI=”http://.../ws/2005/05/identity/claims/surname”>
<DisplayTag>Last Name</DisplayTag>
</SupportedClaim>
</SupportedClaims>
<RequireAppliesTo />
</ic:InfoCardPolicy>
</InfoCard>
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InfoCard issue
• Issue of InfoCards can use any convenient ‘out 
of band’ mechanism, e.g.
– via HTTP;
– via email.
• To give user assurance of validity of InfoCard,  
the InfoCard should be sent with an XML 
signature generated by the IP.
• X.509 certificates including a logo are 
recommended to support this signature.
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Token requests
• When user selects an InfoCard for use with an RP, the 
identity selector requests a security token from the IP 
STS.
• Tokens are requested using the RequestSecurityToken
message specified in WS-Trust.
• The request message includes:
– unique identifier of InfoCard;
– (optionally) set of claims to be authenticated;
– either opaque reference to RP (or actual RP identity if symmetric 
cryptography being used);
– (optionally) request for display token to be shown to user;
– (optionally) type of token.
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Token responses
• Tokens are sent back using the 
RequestSecurityTokenResponse message 
specified in WS-Trust.
• The response message is always sent via 
a confidentiality-protected channel.
• It includes:
– (optionally) a display token;
– key management material, e.g. a certificate;
– the token itself!
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Authenticating to the IP
• The InfoCard specifies the type of credential that 
must be used to authenticate the user to the IP.
• This must take place before any tokens are 
issued.
• A number of credential types are supported by 
CardSpace – we look at a few.
• User authentication messages are protected 
using XML encryption and XML signature.
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Username–password authentication
• The IP can require the user to provide a 
username and password.
• The following credential format for the InfoCard 
is defined:
<ic:UserNamePasswordAuthenticate>
<ic:Username>xs:string</ic:Username> ?
</ic:UserNamePasswordAuthenticate>
• For user convenience the username can be 
included in the InfoCard, but not the password.
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Kerberos-based authentication
• The IP can require the submission of a Kerberos v5 
‘service ticket’.
• The following credential format for the InfoCard is 
defined:
<ic:KerberosV5Authenticate>
<ic:UserPrincipalName>xs:string</ic:UserPrincipalName> ?
</ic:KerberosV5Authenticate>
• The service principal name for the IP must be 
included in the InfoCard, to enable the service 
requester to get an appropriate Kerberos ticket.
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X.509 certificate based authentication
• The IP can require the provision of an X.509 v3 
certificate for the user, where the certificate and 
keys are stored in software.
• The following credential format for the InfoCard is 
defined:
<ic:X509V3Authenticate>
<ds:X509Data>
<wsse:KeyIdentifier ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/xx/
oasis-2004xx-wss-soap-message-security-1.1#ThumbprintSHA1">
xs:base64binary
</wsse:KeyIdentifier>
</ds:X509Data>
</ic:X509V3Authenticate>
• A key identifier for the certificate is provided, based 
on a SHA-1 hash of the entire certificate.
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Implementing CardSpace
• Identity management is a rapidly developing 
area.
• CardSpace, if it succeeds, could significantly 
improve identity security and privacy.
• However, it requires:
– IPs and RPs to support web service based 
interactions;
– user adoption of CardSpace interface, including 
registering with appropriate IPs.
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Sessions in CardSpace
• It is not clear whether a ‘session’ can be 
established between a user and an IP, to 
allow multiple tokens to be generated 
without re-authenticating the user every 
time (or re-use of a ‘cached’ token).
• Of course, this could work if the identity 
selector cached user credentials.
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A privacy issue
• When using CardSpace, the RP receives 
potentially sensitive personal information 
about the user.
• This is because CardSpace permits IPs to 
make assertions about a range of user 
attributes, not just identifiers.
• That is, CardSpace covers both 
identification issues and attribute 
management.
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A user judgement
• Thus, when deciding to go ahead with a 
CardSpace interaction with an RP, a user 
is making an important judgement.
• This is based on the user authentication of 
the RP.
• This is typically based on a public key 
certificate (however, there may not be any 
authentication at all).
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Problems with user perceptions
• It is a well-known problem that, when 
using SSL/TLS sessions, many users 
have no idea of who is being 
authenticated, and how to check this (i.e. 
to look at the address bar).
• This could mean that users are easily 
misled into revealing sensitive personal 
information to bogus RPs. 
60
Improving browser interfaces
• Microsoft is making major efforts to improve the 
user experience in Internet Explorer to make 
matters clearer to users.
• This includes use of ‘high assurance’ certificates 
and green address bars.
• However, even this is not guaranteed to be 
effective (recent experimental results support 
this); moreover, it will be some time before all 
RPs have high assurance certificates.
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A security issue
• The means by which a user authenticates 
to an IP is not restricted by CardSpace.
• It could be just password based.
• If so, and if the password is compromised, 
then the consequences could be very 
serious (it might be possible to 
impersonate the user to many RPs).
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Privacy protection  I
• One way in which privacy could be improved 
would be if the IP’s assertions about a user 
could only be interpreted by an RP which 
already knew what information about the user is 
being asserted.
• If the user reveals its relevant attributes to an RP 
at registration time (a one-off process when the 
user is likely to be more careful), then the 
process of making assertions to an RP could be 
made less privacy-sensitive.
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Privacy protection II
• A solution of this type using ‘Secured from 
Identity Theft’ (SIT) attributes has recently 
been proposed.
• Essentially, this means that the RP asserts 
attributes of a user to an RP in such a way 
that the RP can only interpret the assertion 
if it already knows the attributes.
• This reduces the privacy threat.
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Reinforcing user authentication  I
• The same ‘SIT’ approach can also be 
used to enhance user authentication.
• The user can only prove the assertion to 
the RP if it possesses a copy of the 
attributes being asserted.
• Knowledge of such attributes indirectly 
authenticates the user.
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• It is also possible to build additional user authentication 
on top of CardSpace ‘proof keys’.
• These proof keys are used to prevent ‘theft’ of 
assertions.
• That is, the assertion made by an IP will contain an 
encrypted secret (proof key), and, at the same time, the 
user will be given a copy of this secret by the IP.
• This secret can be used to prove ownership of an 
assertion.
• The secret could be partly made up of a long term secret 
key shared by the user and the IP, providing additional 
user authentication.
Reinforcing user authentication  II
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Scope for research
• CardSpace is clearly of very great 
potential significance, because it is being 
supported by Microsoft (and the WS 
interactions are also being used by other 
parties).
• Hence addressing security and privacy 
issues remains of very great importance.
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